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DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia and the 
Continued Ascendance of Federal 
Common Law:  Class-Action Waivers 
and Mandatory Arbitration Under the 
Federal Arbitration Act 
Michael J. Yelnosky* 
To insiders, the critique of the Supreme Court’s Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA)1 jurisprudence is well known.  It goes 
something like this: when Congress passed the FAA in 1925, it 
was intended to be a simple procedural statute requiring federal 
courts to enforce arbitration agreements.2  However, in the last 
four decades, the Supreme Court has transformed the FAA into a 
source of substantive federal arbitration law requiring 
enforcement of virtually every arbitration agreement entered into 
in the United States.3  And the critics abound.4 
 
* Dean and Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law.  Thanks to 
RWU Law alum Clare Harmon for the push. 
 1.  9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–16 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).   
 2. See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme 
Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 99, 99 (2006); Jonathan R. Nelson, Judge-Made Law and the 
Presumption of Arbitrability: David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft 
Ltd., 58 BROOK. L. REV. 279, 328 (1992). 
 3. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric versus Reality in Arbitration 
Jurisprudence: How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2012, at 129, 131–32. 
 4. See Michael J. Yelnosky, Fully Federalizing the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 90 OR. L. REV. 729, 730–31 (2012) (citing David S. Schwartz, Claim-
Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 250 (2012) (“The 
Supreme Court is as irretrievably lost in its arbitration jurisprudence as it 
has ever been in any line of cases . . . .”)); Linda R. Hirshman, The Second 
Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 
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Now, even outsiders know about the impact of the FAA.  Last 
fall, The New York Times ran a front-page three-part series5 
describing how companies, by inserting arbitration and class-
action waiver provisions into consumer and employment contracts, 
can circumvent the courts and take away one of the few tools 
citizens have to seek remedies for certain illegal or deceitful 
business practices.6  One of the articles quotes The Honorable 
William G. Young, a federal district court judge appointed by 
President Reagan, as saying, “This is among the most profound 
shifts in our legal history . . . . [B]usiness has a good chance of 
opting out of the legal system altogether and misbehaving without 
reproach.”7  Another article emphasized the ubiquity of 
arbitration clauses in the United States: “From birth to death, the 
use of arbitration has crept into nearly every corner of Americans’ 
lives, encompassing moments like having a baby, going to school, 
getting a job, buying a car, building a house and placing a parent 
in a nursing home.”8  Recently, there have been more robust calls 
for FAA reform than ever before,9 but the body of FAA law 
 
1305, 1353 (1985) (The FAA “is now definitively established as a substantive 
federal law, preemptive and binding on the states, and articulating a federal 
policy extending to issues well beyond its literal terms.”). 
  5. Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, When Scripture Is the 
Rule of Law: Companies Can Compel Arbitrations Guided by Religion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2015, at A1 [hereinafter Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, 
Scripture]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, A ‘Privatization of 
the Justice System’: In Arbitration, a Bias Toward Business, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
2, 2015, at A1 [hereinafter Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, Privatization]; 
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, 
Stacking Deck of Justice: Vast Trend Locks Americans Out of Court – Rulings 
Greatly Favor Business, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, at A1. 
 6. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 5, at A1.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, Privatization, supra note 5, at B4. 
 9. For example, in May 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) published for comment proposed rules that would (1) prohibit 
providers of certain consumer financial products and services from using a 
pre-dispute arbitration agreement to block consumer class actions in court 
and (2) require providers that use pre-dispute arbitration agreements to 
submit records relating to arbitral proceedings to the Bureau so that it may 
determine whether further Bureau action is necessary.  Arbitration 
Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32830 (proposed May 24, 2016) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1040).  When the comment period ended on August 22, 2016, the 
CFPB had received 51,799 comments.  Arbitration Agreements, 
REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2016-
0020-0001 (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).  Moreover, on August 25, 2016, the 
Department of Labor issued regulations, pursuant to President Obama’s 
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remains largely intact. 
The cause of all this fuss is the operative provision of the 
FAA, § 2, which provides that: 
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.10 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that: (1) the FAA 
creates federal substantive law favoring arbitration,11 and as such 
that law applies in both federal and state courts;12 (2) arbitration 
agreements are enforceable even where federal statutory claims 
are asserted by the plaintiff;13 (3) most state laws that would 
render arbitration agreements unenforceable are preempted by 
the FAA;14 and (4) a class-action waiver is enforceable even if the 
plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim 
exceeds any potential recovery.15 
Additionally, state law plays an extraordinarily odd role in 
FAA jurisprudence.  Section 2 directs courts to enforce arbitration 
agreements “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.”16  The Supreme Court has read 
that provision as a reference to state law, but only state law that 
“govern[s] issues concerning the validity, revocability, and 
enforceability of contracts generally.  A state-law principle that 
 
Executive Order 13673, that require employers with federal contracts in 
excess of $1,000,000 to offer arbitration to any employee with a claim arising 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or any tort related to or 
arising out of sexual assault or harassment only after such disputes arise.  
Arbitration of Contractor Employee Claims, 81 Fed. Reg. 58562, 58644 (Aug. 
25, 2016) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 22). 
 10. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). 
 11. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“Congress declared 
a national policy favoring arbitration . . . .”). 
 12.  Id. at 16 (“Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts 
to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) (“[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may 
vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will 
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”). 
 14. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).  
 15. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013). 
 16. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). 
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takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to 
arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of  
§ 2.”17 
As I have explained elsewhere, this regime forces courts to 
make fine distinctions between generally applicable state contract 
law and state contract law that singles out arbitration provisions 
for suspect status.18  One commentator has labeled the distinction 
“fundamentally incoherent.”19  And, to further complicate matters, 
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, a 2011 case, the Supreme 
Court held that California’s generally applicable contract doctrine 
of unconscionability could not be applied to render unenforceable a 
class-action waiver in an arbitration agreement.20  However, the 
Court did so not because unconscionability is a state-law doctrine 
that applies uniquely to arbitration, but because the Court found 
that class-wide arbitration “interferes with fundamental 
attributes of arbitration.”21 
As I have also explained elsewhere, the Court’s reading of § 2 
as referring to state law is dicta, and a better reading is that, like 
the rest of § 2, it authorizes the federal courts to create federal 
common law to govern the enforcement of covered arbitration 
agreements.22  The final strand of FAA jurisprudence that is 
important to the forthcoming discussion of DIRECTV, Inc. v. 
Imburgia23 is the Court’s repeated insistence that the FAA’s 
“primary purpose” is to ensure that private agreements to 
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.24  As indicated by 
the Court, courts and arbitrators must “give effect to the 
contractual rights and expectations of the parties,” and the 
parties’ intentions control.25  Pursuant to that mandate, the Court 
enforced a choice-of-law provision in an arbitration agreement 
 
 17. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
 18. See Yelnosky, supra note 4, at 743–44. 
 19. David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of 
Congress over State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 559 (2004). 
 20.  563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011). 
 21.  Id. at 344. 
 22.  Yelnosky, supra note 4, at 736–42, 745–58. 
 23.  136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).   
 24.  Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Legal Stanford Junior Univ., 
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).   
 25.  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 
(2010) (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479).   
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that permitted the arbitrator to award punitive damages26 and a 
provision incorporating California’s arbitration procedures.27  
Conversely, the Court reversed an arbitration panel’s conclusion 
that an arbitration agreement authorized class arbitration 
because there was no evidence that was what the contracting 
parties intended.28 
As is apparent, the Supreme Court has been accepting and 
deciding cases involving the FAA with some frequency.  Some, 
such as American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant in 
201329 and Concepcion in 2011,30 had a high profile.31  DIRECTV, 
Inc. v. Imburgia was not one of those cases.32  The plaintiffs were 
customers of DIRECTV who brought a class action in California 
state court claiming that early termination fees charged to them 
violated California law.33  In the trial court, DIRECTV moved to 
send the matter to arbitration pursuant to the parties’ service 
agreement, which provided that “any Claim either [party] asserts 
 
 26.   Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57–58 
(1995). 
 27.  Volt, 489 U.S. at 474–76.   
 28.  Stolt–Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 673.   
 29.  133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–12 (2013) (holding that a class-action waiver in 
an arbitration agreement was enforceable in an antitrust action even where 
the cost for any plaintiff proceeding individually would far exceed any 
possible remedy).  
 30.  563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (holding that California’s doctrine of 
unconscionability could not be applied to render unenforceable a class-action 
waiver in an arbitration agreement).   
 31.   Binyamin Appelbaum, Justices Support Corporate Arbitration, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 21, 2013, at B3 (covering Italian Colors); Adam Liptak, Supreme 
Court Allows Contracts that Prohibit Class-Action Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 28, 2011, at B3 (covering Concepcion).  
 32.   136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).  While there was some press coverage of the 
Court’s decision, see Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Rules DirecTV Customers 
Must Use Arbitration, Not Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2015, at B3, 
knowledgeable reporters knew that the contract provision at its heart was 
unusual enough to limit its reach. Id.  Prior to the argument in the case, one 
commentator wrote that the biggest surprise was that the Court had 
scheduled the case for argument instead of summarily reversing. Ronald 
Mann, Argument Preview: Justices Face Off Again with California Court 
Refusing To Enforce Arbitration Agreement, SCOTUS BLOG (Oct. 2, 2015, 
11:41 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/10/argument-preview-justices-
face-off-again-with-california-court-refusing-to-enforce-arbitrationagreement.   
When I was asked by the editors of this Law Review if I wanted to write 
something about a case from the Court’s 2015 term, I had complete 
confidence that DIRECTV had not already been “claimed.”  
 33. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 466. 
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will be resolved only by binding arbitration.”34  That contract also 
had a waiver of class arbitration: “Neither [party] shall be entitled 
to join or consolidate claims in arbitration.”35  Finally, the 
contract also provided that “if the ‘law of your state’ makes the 
waiver of class arbitration unenforceable, then the entire 
arbitration provision ‘is unenforceable.’”36 
The trial court denied DIRECTV’s request to send the case to 
arbitration, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed, finding 
that at the time the contract was executed, the class-action waiver 
was unconscionable under California law, and the entire 
arbitration agreement was therefore unenforceable.37  Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Concepcion ruled that California’s 
unconscionability doctrine was preempted by the FAA, the 
California Court of Appeal determined that that decision did not 
change the result here because the parties had simply agreed on a 
choice of law provision pertaining to California law before the 
Concepcion decision.38  It reasoned that the contract provision was 
very specifically directed at class-action waivers and any 
ambiguity about the meaning of the provision should be construed 
against DIRECTV, the drafter.39  The California Supreme Court 
declined to review the case, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and reversed.40 
Justice Breyer, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, Alito and Kagan, began his opinion, somewhat 
oddly, by reminding lower court judges (especially state court 
judges) that federal law is supreme and that they are bound to 
follow Concepcion.41  I say it is odd because he immediately 
acknowledged that this “elementary” point of law did not resolve 
the issue in the case.42  The issue was not whether Concepcion 
controlled; rather, the issue was whether the parties had exercised 
their right to choose the law that would govern their agreement.43  
 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 466-67 (quoting Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
190, 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)). 
 38. Id. at 467 (quoting Imburgia, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 198). 
 39. Id. (quoting Imburgia, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 195).  
 40. Id. at 467–68.  
 41. Id. at 468 (citing Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990)).  
 42. Id.  
 43. See id. at 468 (“In principle, they might choose to have portions of 
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Justice Breyer also acknowledged that the Court was obliged to 
defer to the state courts’ interpretation of the contract, so the 
question was whether that interpretation was consistent with the 
FAA.44 
He concluded that the California Court of Appeal’s 
interpretation of “the law of your state” to include “invalid 
California law” was inconsistent with the FAA because “California 
courts would not interpret contracts other than arbitration 
contracts the same way.”45  The conclusion was based on the 
parties’ failure to provide any examples of a California court 
interpreting a “law of your state” provision to include California 
laws that had been invalidated.46  That same reasoning supported 
the majority’s conclusion that “the law of your state” was not 
ambiguous language and therefore would not ordinarily be 
interpreted against the interest of the drafter.47  The Court thus 
reversed because California’s interpretation of “law of your state” 
did not place arbitration contracts on equal footing with all other 
contracts.48 
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent that Justice Sotomayor 
joined.49  She emphasized that both at the time the service 
agreement was drafted by DIRECTV and at the time the plaintiffs 
commenced their lawsuit, class-action waivers were per se 
unconscionable under California law, and there was no reason for 
plaintiffs to think the Supreme Court would hold years later in 
Concepcion that this body of law was preempted by the FAA.50  
 
their contract governed by the law of Tibet, the law of pre-revolutionary 
Russia, or (as is relevant here) the law of California including [the 
unconscionability doctrine] and irrespective of that rule’s invalidation in 
Concepcion.”).  
 44. Id. (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Legal Stanford Junior 
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)).   
 45. Id. at 469.  
 46. Id.   
 47. See id. at 470 (“But . . . were the phrase ‘law of your state’ ambiguous, 
surely some court would have construed that term to incorporate state laws 
invalidated by, for example, federal labor law, federal pension law, or federal 
civil rights law.  Yet, we have found no such case.”).  
 48. Id. at 471 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna, 546 
U.S. 440, 443 (2006)).  
 49. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas wrote his own dissent 
based on his long-held position that the FAA does not apply in state court 
proceedings. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. at 472 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Imburgia v. DIRECTV, 
Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)). 
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Thus, the California Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the “law of 
your state” provision did not suggest discrimination against 
arbitration.51  Moreover, she explained, a simple class-action 
waiver would have sufficed for DIRECTV’s purposes.52  
Incorporating instead the “law of your state” provision was 
curious, which made the phrase ambiguous.53  Finally, 
interpreting the ambiguous phrase against the drafter was 
completely appropriate here, she explained, because DIRECTV 
was by far the more powerful party in this transaction.54  She 
concluded that the majority demeaned the California Court of 
Appeal’s application of traditional tools of state contract law.55 
So, why did I want to write about this case?  The answer, I am 
afraid, is somewhat self-serving.  I think Imburgia is an example 
of the Court coming even closer to adopting, sub silentio, the 
approach I argued for some years ago when I suggested that § 2’s 
savings clause does not refer to state law, but to federal common 
law created by the courts when interpreting and determining the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements covered by the FAA.56 
It is already the case, notwithstanding the Court’s insistence, 
that § 2 refers to state law, and that most of that state law is 
preempted by “a federal common law of arbitration contract 
interpretation.”57  But in Imburgia, as Justice Ginsburg points 
out, the Court, for the first time, “reversed a state-court decision 
on the ground that the state court misapplied state contract law 
when it determined the meaning of a term in a particular 
arbitration agreement.”58  That would be an undeniable expansion 
of the Court’s already capacious willingness to displace state law, 
 
 51. Id. at 473. 
 52. Id. at 474. 
 53. See id. at 474–75 (“DIRECTV chose a different formulation, one 
referring to the ‘law of [its customer’s] state.’  I would not translate that term 
to be synonymous with ‘federal law.’  If DIRECTV meant to exclude the 
application of California legislation, it surely chose a bizarre way to 
accomplish that result.”).  
 54. Id. at 475.   
 55. Id. at 478.  
 56. Yelnosky, supra note 4, at 753–54; see also Cunningham, supra note 
3, at 150; Stephen K. Huber, Confusion About Class Arbitration, 7 J. TEX. 
CONSUMER L. 2, 6 (2003).   
 57. Huber, supra note 56, at 6.  
 58. 136. S. Ct. at 473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds International Corp., the Court came close, but there it reversed 
an arbitration panel’s interpretation of the parties’ contract to authorize class 
arbitration.  559 U.S. 662, 672–75 (2010).  
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while at the same time paying lip service to its continuing role.59  
And Justice Ginsburg is undoubtedly correct that after this 
decision, consumers “lack even the benefit of the doubt when 
anomalous terms in [adhesion contracts requiring arbitration] 
reasonably could be construed to protect their rights.”60  Imre 
Szalai  has similarly noted that the Court in Imburgia expanded 
FAA preemption to include not only state laws but state court 
judges’ interpretations of the language of arbitration 
agreements.61 
The last question I want to anticipate is why I would advocate 
for the expansion of federal authority in this area, where such 
federal authority (the Supreme Court) has been so willing to leave 
consumers, employees, and others with claims against businesses 
out in the cold.  The short answer is that I am not advocating for 
the current content of FAA law.  Instead, I am arguing that an 
expansive role for federal law in § 2 is more consistent with the 
interpretation of the rest of the statute, as well as the likely 
understanding of the 1925 Congress; uniform law makes sense in 
this area; and there is nothing about federal common law that is 
inherently pro-business.62  Indeed, in the most analogous 
statutory regime—Section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act of 1947, which authorizes federal common law 
regulation of union-employer arbitration in the private sector—the 
law is not skewed in favor of employers.63  There is no reason, 
other than the current composition of the Court, that what would 
emerge from a fully federalized FAA would not be an improvement 
on the status quo.64 
 
 
 59. See Yelnosky, supra note 4, at 757–58. 
 60. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 476 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 61. Imre Szalai, DIRECTV v. Imburgia Turns Arbitration Law on its 
Head, INDISPUTABLY (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.indisputably.org/?p=7902. 
 62. See Yelnosky, supra note 4, at 748–51.   
 63. See id. at 748. 
 64. Id. at 759.   
